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Our work is based on the hypothesis of an existing interconnection between symbolic-
metaphoric elements of the literary text and a series of mind patterns. These compress percep-
tion and experience through the emergent process of conceptual blending triggering the seman-
tic process during the creative act of poiesis. This enquiry focuses on the use of a peculiar rhetor-
ical figure in an exemplary literary text of the famous German poet Goethe. We will try to point 
out the allegorical function of the scene dedicated to the «Mothers’ Kingdom», in his Faust II, as 
a powerful poetical meta-reflection on imagination, cognition and poetics itself. 
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Art can be considered as a creative human process of experiencing, understanding and 
communicating reality through symbols and metaphors. Therefore no artistic work can 
be analysed without taking into account the complex dynamics of the human cognitive 
system. Literature becomes often a privileged way to meta-critically reflect upon the 
imaginative representation of imagination as a cognitive process. This article presents a 
part of our work towards a new neurocognitive hermeneutics, which points out the in-
tertwining of the following elements: the symbolic/metaphoric level of literary texts and 
the cognitive patterns in charge for compression at human scale of perception and con-
ceptualization; the emergence, at poietic level, of system-patterns of perception and of 
the multidimensional continuum view within the semantic peculiarity of each literary text 
through the processes of compression, double-scope integration and narration eliciting 
the imaginal construction. 
In particular, the article presents a brief cognitive enquiry about the process of imagi-
nation as it is meta-critically and poetologically figured out in the exegetically controver-
sial scene Finstere Galerie (Gloomy Gallery) in the second part of Johann Wolfgang von 
Goethe’s drama Faust.  
Our aim is to point out the dynamic emergent process of imagination by newly inter-
preting this scene, referring to the modern sciences of the mind and to the aesthetic de-
bate about imagination in Goethe’s time. In our opinion, this scene, in which Faust has 
to descent to the Mothers’ Kingdom, is an allegorical figuration of the mental process of 
imagination itself, considered as an endogenous, dynamic, emergent process involving a 
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cluster of cognitive faculties activated in order to construct meaning through the creation 
of aesthetic forms. Goethe tries here to overcome the cognitive limits of figuring the in-
visible, intended as a sort of pre-categorical dimension, a flurry horizon of pure, unex-
pressed potentiality – in Elio Franzini’s words “il senso fungente dell’estetico” [the acting 
sense of aesthetics] (Franzini 7) –, which is to be surveyed by rewinding the process of 
its appearing within the symbolic dimension. The latter often transcends the empiric ob-
servation despite having its very origin in experience. Using the term invisible we refer to 
a realm of “possibility and latency” (Merleau-Ponty 44), that realm which includes all 
hidden elements, forcing vision to go beyond the threshold of visibility and matter.  
In this perspective human imagination is able to model the invisible by creating eidola. 
The indistinct horizon of the pure unexpressed potentiality in the realm of the invisible is 
in direct relation to the visible, including the hidden parts of a perceived object. The im-
age, as a whole, emerges containing also what is hidden to direct vision. These premises 
make it possible to analyse images by following the process of their becoming visible 
within an horizon of meaning that, although exceeding the empirical survey, finds its ful-
filment in sensory experience. In this perspective the invisible is not the unknown, the 
unspeakable, and so on, but a sort of pre-categorical dimension, the source of any act of 
imagination. 
Some literary texts represent, in our opinion, the act of imagination itself by figura-
tively rewinding the mental function that lets a meaningful figuration of creativity emerge 
out of the invisible. Such texts often present a very condensed and metaphorical repre-
sentation of imagination and of cognition in flurry and metamorphic images. This hap-
pens during the above mentioned scene of Faust: Goethe goes beyond the limits of the 
human mind’s sensory experience as he tries to represent this invisible, pre-noetic back-
ground of all possible forms, by imagining a dynamic, metamorphic, floating cloud full 
of all possible forms.  
After a great allegorical parade at the Emperors palace, Faust is asked to bring on 
scene, in a sort of illusionary show, “Das Musterbild der Männer so der Frauen” [“the 
ideal form of Man and Woman”] (v. 6185), the prototype of beauty. To carry out this re-
quest Faust has to face a dangerous challenge. Mephisto warns him about the difficulties 
implied in getting the ideal form of beauty in front of the audience, because to do this he 
has to reach the pure indistinct potentiality of form itself, represented by a vortex, a tur-
moil of fluctuating images that perception is unable to identify and comprehend. This 
experience takes place in a mysterious landscape, the Kingdom of the Mothers, where no 
space or time exists, nor do any perceptive references. This boundless realm represents, 
in our opinion, Goethe’s figuration of creative imagination itself. Therefore the scene 
puts us in front of the fundamental question expressed by Merlau-Ponty and then re-
formulated by Thompson: “What is the mode or manner in which form appears to mind 
and what is the epistemological origin of this mode of givenness?” (Thompson 81). 
Before trying to give an answer to this core question, we have to give a brief account 
about imagination in terms of a mental process, even considering the risk of being in-
complete and too brief as far as imagination is a concept more frequently referred to 
than explained, even by philosophers. It plays an important role for many philosophers – 
from Aristotle to Hume, from Kant to Husserl and in contemporary thought. This is due 
to its complex and multimodal character and to its playing an active role in almost every 
mental process that puts the subject in relation with the environment. Moreover, imagi-
nation regulates the relation between percepts and imaginal representations in the con-
struction of the “human imagination spectrum” (McGinn 159), or the «multidimensional 
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spectrum view» (Thomas 7) determining the image of the world that surrounds each per-
ceiving subject. 
The hard question of what imagination is has been not only philosophically and sci-
entifically investigated, with different, contradictory and partial results, but also meta-
critically reflected upon in art and poetry. In our opinion, some literary texts metaphori-
cally try to vividly represent the active process of figuring significant visual images out of 
the invisible as well as the mental imaginative and cognitive process in itself. Literary 
texts become, therefore, very interesting forms of virtually experiencing the imaginative 
process itself from a very personal and creative point of view.   
As claimed by Francisco Varela: 
 
Imagination is one of the quintessential qualities of life and of our being. Its central attrib-
ute is the manifestation of vivid, lived mental content that does not refer directly to a per-
ceived world but to an absence that it evokes. (195) 
 
For the central role it plays in the mind processing system, imagination is an impor-
tant topic in the latest neuro-cognitive researches. So, for instance, Mark Turner has 
stressed many times the importance of developing the study of imagination not only in 
order to improve our understanding of this great mystery of the human mind, but also to 
explain some other core faculties of the human brain and mind system that depend on 
imagination (“L’imagination et le cerveau”). 
Imagination can be observed and described as a sort of complex system exhibiting 
features that are referred to as self organization or emergence, implying the activation of mul-
tiple neural circuits that are involved in superior associative cognitive functions. These 
systems, which are fundamentally chaotic, or complex, have the capacity of producing 
patterns that are seemingly non-chaotic and predictable. Referring to Varela’s and 
Thompson’s work, every living organism is an enactive and imagining being, integrating 
a series of similar processes. Under this perspective, imagination can be considered as an 
integrated and dynamic flow of sensorimotor, memorial, visual and eidetic activations 
(Varela, Thompson and Rosch; Dennett and Kinsbourne; Pöppel and Schill; Varela and 
Depraz): 
 
Mental acts are characterized by the concurrent participation of several functionally dis-
tinct and topographically distributed regions of the brain and their sensorimotor embodi-
ment. […] It follows that one cannot hope to find a naturalized account of imagination as 
some sort of cognitive module or brain region. It must necessarily correspond, instead, to 
a dynamic, emerging global pattern that is able both to integrate the body/brain activity at 
a large scale and subside rapidly, for the benefit of the next moment of mental life. (Varela 
and Depraz 201-202) 
 
This means that the work of imagination is, basically and very simplified, that of re-
ducing to form the vast and diffuse reality of our environment, in order to generate a 
mental-cognitive state corresponding to the constitution of an assembly, which incorpo-
rates or discards into its coherent components other “concurrent neural activities gener-
ated exogenously or endogenously” (Thompson 79). 
Thanks to this dynamic, inferential, integrated process of imagination, the subject 
builds the imaginative figuration of the world and of his being in the world as autopoietic 
subject (Maturana and Varela). Imagination, like perception, memory, consciousness, 
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cognition and the other connected enactive functions and processes, is engaged in creat-
ing the reproductive consciousness and the multidimensional spectrum of the world: 
  
Dynamically this entire process seems to take the form of a bifurcation from a noisy back-
ground to a transiently stable, distributed structure bound by synchrony. […] The neural 
events that participate in this process of synthetic interpretation via synchronization are 
derived indistinctly from sensory coupling and from the intrinsic activity of the nervous 
system itself. (Varela 100-101) 
 
To conclude this brief account about the complex nature of imagination we quote 
again a definition by Varela and Depraz, referring to the living organism in its own basic 
constitution as an enactive imaginary being:  
 
Mental acts are characterized by the concurrent participation of several functionally dis-
tinct and topographically distributed regions of the brain and their sensorimotor embodi-
ment. (Varela and Depraz 201) 
 
Imagination works on the basis of a large-scale integration of multiple concurrent 
processes: 
 
It is fair to say that imagination is emblematic, in fact, of a cluster of human abilities: imag-
ining proper, or mental imagery, remembrance, fantasy, and dreaming. Imagination is an 
inexhaustible source in all these dimensions, explored and praised by human cultures 
throughout the world, a witness to its centrality. (Varela and Depraz 195) 
 
In order to explain the poetic imaginative process we have isolated three basic fea-
tures deriving from the above mentioned cognitive approach. Quite surprisingly these 
features are nearly corresponding to similar ones focussed on in the aesthetic debate in 
Germany during the 18th century: 
1. the fundamental pattern, focussed by Fauconnier and Turner, of double-scope in-
tegration, activating the metaphoric bases of cognition and therefore the majestic 
allegory of imagination; 
2. the act of distinction, presiding the modelling of form out of the pre-noetic back-
ground; 
3. the process of narration, that organizes elements of cognition along a narrative 
path giving the way to conscious cognition and prevision. 
As for the first feature, the process of double-scope integration controls, in Turner’s 
idea, several complex mental processes like: 
 meaning-making by compressing the complex sensory motor inputs at human 
scale; 
 modelling of frames by comparing heterogeneous mental spaces; 
 creative production of cognition by shifting heterogeneous mental spaces into a 
blended space where a new production of meaning takes place (Fauconnier and 
Turner). 
Gilles Fauconnier defines mental spaces as domains of backstage cognition, abstract 
mental constructs that are generally set up on the basis of general scenarios. They are 
mental constructs of potential realities dynamically prompted as a conceptualizer listens 
to a string of speech or reads a text. The peculiarity of mental spaces lies in the fact that 
they are constructs of potential realities rather than perfect mirrors of the world. They 
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are linked by vital relations like: time/space, cause/effect, part/whole, identity, analogy, 
change, representation, role, propriety, category, intention, contradiction, primary experi-
ences (Mental Spaces). 
Through the process of double-scope integration, different mental spaces are pro-
jected into an integrated space giving birth to a new creation of meaning or an act of 
cognition of what previously lacked understanding. This happens in metaphor, which is 
the result of a process of double-scope integration. 
Following the thesis of Lakoff and Johnson, imagination works determining “catego-
rization, reason, propositional and non-propositional forms of thought,” “through the 
application of metaphor and narrative” (193). In the blended space of metaphor “catego-
rization, reason, propositional and non-propositional forms of thought” take place. 
“Metaphor is one of our most important tools for trying to comprehend partially what 
cannot be comprehended totally: our feelings, aesthetic experiences, moral practices, and 
spiritual awareness” (193). 
As for the second feature, imagination, by creating mental spaces of new meaning, 
presumes a basic non-conscious cognitive act: that of distinction. By means of this act 
we specify a unit as an entity distinct form a background. This implies autopoiesis on the 
side of the observer. Distinction is an essential top-down modality, which lets the pre-
noetic, unconscious and pre-reflexive background take form. Following the late Husserl, 
this means that imagining corresponds to the act of distinction making visible the not 
visible and giving access to the essence of reality. 
As for the third feature, narrative imagining – particularly that kind of narration using 
metaphor – is the fundamental function of organizing thought. “Rational capacities de-
pend upon it. It is our chief means of looking into the future, of predicting, of planning 
and of explaining. It is a literary capacity indispensable to human cognition generally” 
(Turner, The Literary Mind 5). 
 
 
Pointing out these three basic features, we have outlined the fundamental intertwining 
processes of imagination at work in our analysis of Goethe’s scene.  In this perspective 
imagination allows us to comprehend different elements of the invisible, creating phan-
toms, eidola of what cannot be caught and understood with our sensorimotor system or 
thanks to the creation of mental spaces linked together by vital relations. Imagination is 
in fact one of the most important cognitive processes of the human mind, because it re-
duces what overwhelms our comprehension into images, representing the hidden es-
sence of the whole. The top achievement of this process is the intuition of endlessness. 
At the point where cognition fails, imagination and intuition supply the subject with 
creative figurations of the infinite metamorphic flow of existence. 
In the aesthetic reflection of Goethe’s time, we find theories about imagination focus-
ing on three basic features. Apart from the debate about imagination in the period of 
Enlightment and from the negative opinion expressed by philosophers like Jacobi and 
Maimon, in Goethe’s and Kant’s view, Einbildungskraft [Imagination] assumes the func-
tion of synthesis.  
As for the first feature, the “Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen” [synthesis of multiplicity] 
– comparable to a function of the cognitive concept of double scope integration – was 
considered as: 
 
The fundamental product of imagination, of a blind and essential function of the soul, in-
dispensable for cognition, but seldomly conscious. (Kant § 10) 
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Following Kant’s words: 
 
Synthesis, in most general terms […], brings different images together in order to com-
prehend their multiplicity into one single cognition. […] [Synthesis] transforms different 
elements into cognition and gathers all of them around the same content; therefore it is 
the first process that must be studied in order to understand the origin of our cognitive 
power. […] Such a productive ability to synthetize multiplicity houses in each person and 
we call it imagination (§ 10). 
 
Productive imagination [Einbildungskraft] links different images [Vorstellungen] together 
following the rules of reason, structured on pure concepts (categories). The synthesis 
produced by imagination is therefore to be considered as a product of reason depending 
on perception. Imagination defines on one hand the process compressing multitude and 
multiplicity into mental images and meaningful symbols, but also, on the other hand, the 
faculty of expanding human experience over its cognitive and perceptive limits.  
Goethe considers imagination, in a non spiritualistic way, as the faculty of compre-
hending the world by figuring it with all its features, even those that do not pertain di-
rectly to perception. An interesting statement by Goethe (referred by Eckermann on the 
27th January 1830) defines imagination as the most important ‘tool’ for the natural scien-
tific thought. He specifies that the imaginative process derives its contents mainly from 
perception, from the givenness of nature and the vividness of reality, further transform-
ing these elements into concepts, into mental spaces blended together:  
 
Basically, it is impossible to imagine a really good scientist lacking this superior faculty. I 
don’t mean that kind of imagination proceeding into vagueness and just imagining not ex-
isting things. I mean that kind of imagination resting on the solid ground of perception 
and proceeding from reality and knowledge towards new unknown suppositions. This 
makes it possible to check if the imagined elements respond to the conditions of reality 
and if they contrast to other rules of consciousness. Such a kind of imagination needs, of 
course, a very calm mind with a wide knowledge of the living system and of their rules and 
principles. (Eckermann 27 January 1830) 
 
As for the second feature, in the aesthetic theory of Goethe’s friend Karl Philipp 
Moritz, distinction is intended as a natural development from an original magmatic flow, 
pervaded by what he calls Tatkraft, a fundamental energy that creates by destroying in 
order to regenerate. This energy works in two ways: on one side it becomes Bildungskraft 
[creative force], on the other Empfindungskraft [receptive force]. The energy of Tatkraft 
tends steadily to unity, wholeness, and the artist is able to represent beauty only by disas-
sembling the perceptive reality and creatively rebuilding it in the new phenomenon of his 
work of art.  
The first act of distinction corresponds to the autopoiesis of the subject: the self-
making for an organism involving self-referential processes capable of evolution, despite 
an operationally-closed relationship with its undefined environment (Maturana and 
Varela). The relation between the subject and its environment is set by perception and 
ruled by narration. In fact, the German word Einbildungskraft [imagination] includes the 
meaning of modelling matter within a form. 
As for the third feature, in a very interesting passage of a letter, and in many parts of 
his scientific work, Goethe theorizes the different steps of the imaginative process cul-
minating in the act of Erleuchtung (enlightment). This is the last step of imagination, re-
sulting from the process of reducing the mental elaboration of perception at human scale 
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thanks to the narrative organisation through similes. Percepts and mental images are 
linked and transformed through vital relations, like space and time, cause and effect and 
so on, modulated and rearranged along a narrative pathway. The surprising step, which 
transforms the phenomenal reality into narration, takes place through an act of blending, 
based on linking similes: 
 
Observation needs imagination: imagination works at first imitating, just replying things; 
then it becomes productive, giving life to the comprehended, developing it, expanding it, 
transforming it. Further we think there is another form of imagination: the farsighted one, 
looking around on evidence, capturing similes in order to confirm the defined. 
Great is the power of analogy, applied by the spirit to so many important elements, 
and powerful the way it works by putting together what belongs together or what seems 
similar. 
This is the way we create similes. The closer to the object they are, the worthier and 
enlighting. The best of them are those that seem to cover it up completely and to be iden-
tical with it. (Letter to Karl Ludwig von Knebel 21 February 1821- FA 2:9152) 
 
Very interesting, but still neglected, is the third modality of imagination pointed out 
by Goethe, translated as farsighted imagination. The German term umsichtig refers to a sort 
of all around gaze, the very gaze that precedes the moment of representation through 
distinction. This particular faculty of imagination uses similes to provide verbal discourse 
with phenomenal and cognitive givenness. The simile, pointed out by Goethe, is a sort 
of mental integrated space. The human mind senses everything scattered in parts; in a 
second space the mind projects the unity of the elements by having the intuition of the 
whole, which is alien to perception. Similes take place in the integrated space where this 
reunification of the parts is possible. Thanks to its creative power, similes enlighten the 
physical object by recovering its noumenic essence. Surprisingly enough Goethe de-
scribes the simile as an integrated space based on the relation between objects in their 
phenomenal reality and verbal signs: “The closer to the object [similes] are, the worthier 
and enlightening.” In other words, he states the possibility of putting ontologically dif-
ferent realities in relation. 
Imagination creates mental integrated spaces mainly thanks to analogies: this makes it 
possible to discover relations between very different elements, like phenomenal events 
and verbal figurations. Both phenomenal forms of nature and verbal images of speech 
derive from the same infinite creative, organic and transformative power of nature 
(Thatkraft), which only metaphor and simile are able to represent (compress) at a con-
sciousness scale. 
A simile is able to intertwine phenomenal events and words, since the last ones par-
ticipate of the organic complexity of existence and share the common morphological 
root of the whole living system. In this perspective it is possible to cognitively model a 
totality that the human mind is unable to realize through its logic procedures and vital 
relations. Both the forms of natural phenomena and those of verbal figurations share the 
same endless reproductive drive, which reason cannot get by its perceptive dimension. 
This is, for instance, what happens in Goethe’s reflection about the Urpflanze [the arche-
typal plant]. Observing morphology and metamorphosis he creates a blended space in 
which the ideal archetypal form takes place. 
Goethe shares with many contemporary poets and particularly with Novalis the idea 
of an organic and pervasive nature. Nature is a complex system in which every part or 
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element participates in common main aims and rules, and first of all in the dynamic prin-
ciples of growth, reproduction and evolution: 
 
My body does not give the idea of being a separate peculiar part of the all, but just a varia-
tion of it. To get to the cognition of the all, the mind uses the process of analogy. But 
analogy rests directly and completely on the absolute cognition of the parts. These two 
strategies of thought, put together, produce an antithetic-synthetic cognition that is imme-
diate. Thanks to its immediate character it becomes possibly mediated, real and symbolic 
at the same time. Every kind of analogy is symbolic. I feel my body active and defined by 
itself and by the soul of the world. My body is a little all, and has therefore also a peculiar 
soul. In fact, what I call soul is that force that transforms the all into a whole: the principle 
of identification. (Novalis 131)  
 
In his Zur Morphologie [About Morphology], published in 1831, Goethe wrote: 
 
multiplicity in unity, at unity. It is no more upsetting when we say: inferior life divides it-
self from life; upper life becomes structured on life and here each part becomes a new liv-
ing element. (Goethe, II, 6, 1831 353). 
 
The three elements, previously mentioned as fundamental for imagination, core ele-
ments in the aesthetic thought during Goethe’s time, enable us to present now a new in-
terpretation of the scene Gloomy Gallery in Faust II, which so far has been considered very 
difficult and controversial.  
As already pointed out and as we will demonstrate with a close-reading of the text in 
the light of the above mentioned categories, this part of the poem represents a narrative 
and allegorical figuration of the mental process of imagination attending to the creation 
of form out of a pre-noetic background. From a figuration of pure pre-noetic potential-
ity the intuitive act, becoming real in the symbol thanks to a double-scope integration, 
represents imagination itself. 
The pre-noetic background is vividly represented in Goethe’s text by the description 
of the Mothers’ Kingdom. Mephistopheles warns Faust from facing this very dangerous 
challenge. The place that Faust has to reach, the Mother’s Kingdom, is described as 
“fremdestes Bereich” [“most alien sphere”] (v. 6195), a place where no categories of 
space or time do exist, nor do any relations with forms, objects or percepts. There is just 
a vast and fluctuating cloud, full of potentiality but without form. It is impossible to de-
scribe the Mothers’ Kingdom, because every element in there implies its contrary. It is 
dangerous for the human being because the absence of percepts puts his autopoietic fac-
ulty in trouble: 
 
Kein Weg! Ins Unbetretene, 
Nicht zu Betretende! Ein Weg ans 
Unerbene, 
Nicht zu Erbittende! Bist du bereit? – 
Nicht Schlösser sind, nicht Riegel weg-
zuschieben, 
Von Einsamkeiten wirst umhergetrie-
ben. 
Hast du Begriff von Öd und Einsam-
keit? 
(vv. 6222-27) 
No path! Into the un-enterable, 
Never to be entered: One path to the 
un-askable, 
Never to be asked: Are you ready? 
No locks, no bolts to manipulate, 
You’ll drift about in solitary space. 
Can you conceive the waste and soli-
tary? 
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With great poetic impact, Goethe presents this alien sphere denying any reference to 
perception (vv. 6240-48). Faust enters the sphere of pure interiority (“ins Tiefste” / “in 
the depths” v. 6220), the pre-categorical level, where only solitude, emptiness and desola-
tion are to be found, the “ewig leere Ferne” [“the eternal empty faraway”] (v. 6246). The 
result is a sudden Schaudern [“shudder”] (v. 6271), because this experience exceeds his 
cognitive power: it is the contrary of perception and reality, it is a non-consistent reality 
(“der Gebilde losgebundene Reich” [“boundless realm of all forms”]; v. 6277). 
It is here that the processes of distinction, compression and modelling of form take 
place: “Gestaltung, Umgestaltung, des ewigen Sinne ewige Unterhaltung” [“Formation, 
Transformation, eternal minds eternal recreation”] (v. 6288). In this pre-noetic realm of 
form, at the fringe of being and not being, represented as a cloudy turmoil, Faust knows 
that the possibility of getting to the All of creation is near. So he says to Mephisto: “In 
deinem Nichts hoff’ich das All zu finden” [“In your Nothingness, I hope, the All I will 
recover”] (v. 6256), because he knows that this cloud contains past, present and future 
and all the potentialities of form. 
In this vast, empty space, Faust has to look for a glowing tripod, signalling his arrival 
in the “Gebilde losgebundene Reich” [“boundless realm of all forms”] (v. 6277). The tri-
pod is traditionally the symbol the prophetic power of Delphy’s Oracle and in this case it 
stands for the work of intuition: in other words, for the direct synchronization of the 
subject’s faculty of imagination with the pre-noetic dimension of reality. Memories take 
active part into the dynamic process of thought and of creative and poetic figuration. In-
tuition, on the contrary, is an act of synchronization that does not refer to linear links, 
like vital relations or similes, but is able to blend different and very unusual image sche-
mas together. This is a process that seems very similar to what Moritz called Emp-
findungskraft [receptive force]. Intuition is considered part of the receptive force of the 
human mind and works on an emotional level, parallel to the faculty of distinction and 
narration. 
To guide Faust in his descent, Mephisto provides him with a “little key,” growing and 
glowing in his hand and disclosing him magic secrets. This is the symbol of the cognitive 
power of the human mind transforming factual reality into metaphors, symbols, allego-
ries through the blending process of connecting and unifying their heterogeneity: in 
Moritz’ terms, Bildungskraft [creative force].  In fact the key has already been frequently 
referred to the tradition of white and black magic and explicitly to the ancient grimoire of 
the Lesser Key of Solomon (Clavicula Salomonis Regis). Thanks to the force of the key Faust 
will be able to find the place where the tripod glows and shows the Mothers in its light: 
 
Bei seinem Schein wirst du die Mütter 
sehn: 
Die einen sitzen, andre stehn und gehn, 
Wies eben kommt. Gestaltung, Umge-
staltung 
Des ewigen Sinnes ewige Unterhaltung. 
Umschwebt von Bildern aller Kreatur, 
Sie sehen dich nicht, denn Schemen 
sehn sie nur!  
(v. 6285-90) 
By its light [of the tripod] you’ll see 
Mothers, 
Some sit about, randomly, the others, 
Stand and move. Formation, Transfor-
mation, 
Eternal minds’ eternal recreation. 
Images of all creatures float, portrayed: 
They’ll not see you: they only see 
schemes. 
 
These mysterious goddesses are surrounded by a moving and fluctuating cloud with-
out form, but rich of pure indistinct metamorphic content. The cloud, symbolizing the 
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infinite transformation of nature, is recurring in Goethe’s works (see for instance the po-
ems Ganymed and Howards Ehrengedächtnis), but in this case it becomes an important strat-
egy to represent, into a visible and thinkable form the power of imagination and active 
creation.  
In the allegory of the Mothers, Goethe represents all human mental processes: the 
continuous dynamic processing of percepts that keeps the relation between the subject 
and the environment up to date and efficient (“Gestaltung, Umgestaltung” [“Formation, 
Transformation”]; v. 6287); the transformation of cognitive data by linking different per-
cepts and experiences through image schemas and mental spaces (the key and the tri-
pod), which form noetic thought and meaning (“Des ewigen Sinnes ewige Unterhaltung” 
[“eternal minds eternal recreation”]; v. 6288), triggering autopoiesis and consequently 
narration and parable in order to create the images of reality (“Bildern aller Kreatur” 
[“Images of all creatures”]; v. 6289). 
In the abyss Faust finally finds the tripod and hooks it with the key bringing it to the 
emperor’s court on stage. This act of hooking the tripod with the key is the allegorical 
representation of the process of double-scope integration giving life to a narrative figura-
tion. This act gives form to the formless, to the fluctuating endless concept of ideal beauty. 
The pre-noetic shapelessness surrounding the mothers, as fundamental element of the 
unconscious human activity becomes a form thanks to the act of distinction. From the 
metamorphic flow of essence the poet evokes the power of the Mothers who see just 
«schemes» («Schemen» v. 6290). His intuition of the essence gets finally out of the cloud 
as form. 
In this way Goethe creates a paradoxical circuit: the narrative fiction figuratively re-
winds a mental process going beyond the human capacity of narratively representing the 
fundamental cognitive act. Activating this process he gives form to the shapeless creating 
images of pure potentiality (concepts, ideals, words), particles of the pre-noetic back-
ground, little defined but highly evocative. The double-scope blending, by unifying the 
faculty of intuition (represented by the tripod) and that of symbolization (the key), trig-
gers an autopoietic process that, thanks to the processes of distinction and compression 
of pre-existing image schemas brought to consciousness, lets all forms emerge. 
The whole autopoietic emerging process of imagination bases on the organic struc-
ture that nature and thought have in common. This common organic structure makes it 
possible to blend very different elements together – for example, images and words. In 
fact, in Goethe’s all-unifying organic view, words are direct manifestation of the ephem-
eral force of transformation representing the endless potential manifestation of the world 
and of our mind. Words are in Goethe’s opinion part of human nature, symbolic con-
nections between the phenomenal nature and our mind. According to Louwerse and 
Jeuniaux, language is both embodied and symbolic, as attested by the symbol interdipendency 
hypothesis, and symbols have great cognitive power; they are the basic tools of our imagi-
nary world. Linguistic understanding is therefore the result of a mixed process, both em-
bodied and symbolic, and words are the vehicle of symbols. They emerge from the or-
ganic nature of the phenomenal world and of the denotative universe of sign. Words are 
able to ‘cover’ – as Goethe said about the rhetorical figure of the simile – the referred 
object. They are able to cover up its essence, transforming it and becoming identical by 
the act of Erleuchtung [enlightening].   
Back from the journey into the deepest abyss of the imaginary power, Faust will 
evoke the two mythological characters that the audience is waiting for:  
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In eurem Namen, Mütter, die ihr thront 
Im Grenzenlosen, ewig einsam wohnt, 
Und doch gesellig! Eur Haupt 
umschwenben  
Des Lebens Bilder, regsam, ohne Le-
ben. 
[…] 
Die einen faßt des Leben holder Lauf, 
Die andern sucht der kühne Magier auf. 
In reicher Spende läßt er voll Vertrauen, 
was jeder wünscht, das Wunderwärtige 
schauen. 
(vv. 6427-6438) 
In your name, Mothers, you enthroned 
In boundlessness, set eternally alone, 
And yet together. All the Forms of Life 
Float round your heads, active, not 
alive. 
[…] 
Life holds some fast on its sweet track, 
Others the bold magician must bring 
back: 
Filled with faith, and richly generous, 
He shows, what each desires, the Mar-
vellous. 
 
Faust, presented as a skilful magician, alter ego of the artist, is said to be artful and dar-
ing; in other words, his mind is able to get beyond the pure images of nature and, follow-
ing a principle claimed in the same period also by Lichtenberg and the brothers Grimm, 
he produces a creative symbolic integration in order to model form out of boundless-
ness: he imagines imagination.  
After Faust’s touching again the tripod with the key, a dark mist fills the room and 
with its swirling represents again the mental action needed to evoke the myth: again 
movement, compression, distinction, similarity, blending, so the cloudy mist “gedehnt, 
geball, verschränkt, geteilt, gepaart. Und nun erkennt ein Geister-Meisterstück!” 
[“Grows, condenses, shrinks, and splits in two./ And now behold a spirit-masterpiece!”] 
(v. 6442-43). 
The mysterious “Weißnichtwie” [“who-knows-how”] (v. 6445), of becoming form 
and body, becomes an intangible melody pervading the scene: 
 
So wie sie wandeln, machen sie Musik! 
Aus luft’gen Tönen quillt ein Weiß-
nichtwie, 
In dem sie ziehen, wird alles Melodie. 
Der Säulenschaft, auch die Triglyphe 
klingt 
Ich glaube gar, der ganze Tempel singt. 
(vv. 6444-48) 
As it moves about, there’s music with-
out cease. 
In heavenly tones, pours out a who-
knows how, 
And while it moves, all’s turned to mel-
ody now. 
The pillared shafts, even the triglyph, 
ringing 
I think that the whole temple’s singing. 
 
Paris first and then Helen emerge out of the formless smoke of the tripod bewilder-
ing the audience. But to our astonishment Goethe does not describe them. Instead, and 
more interestingly, he just reports the different comments and exclamations given by the 
audience in front of the unusual scene. This is the way in which Goethe makes it possi-
ble to let the audience see “Was jeder wünscht, das Wunderwürdige schauen” (“what 
each desires, the marvellous”; v. 6238). In this way the author performs the act of frui-
tion itself: each person looking at the scene on stage recognizes not a common principle 
of ideal beauty, but the elements of their own concept of ideal beauty. The act of fruition 
triggers the imaginative power of the audience, which closes the hermeneutic circle by 
duplicating the creative imaginative act of poetry in the observer. In this way Goethe 
concludes the phylogenetic process of imagination by the act of fruition: imaginative fea-
tures become real only through the act of subjective fruition. The subject’s imagination is 
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triggered by the artist to follow the signed path and to fill in the proposed ideal schema 
with the contents of his own experience, memories, engrams, mnestic traces of one’s 
own latent imaginative world. 
In conclusion, we have tried to put in evidence the meta-cognitive process of repre-
senting imagination itself along its ontogenetic and phylogenetic development, following 
the poetic representation created by Goethe in this very peculiar scene of the second part 
of the drama Faust. This has been interpreted as a poetical attempt that puts the reader 
(and the audience) in the paradoxical condition of ‘assisting’ to one of the more complex 
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